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Over the past century, the world economy has passed through a succession
of phases characterized by very different levels of internstionsl capital
flows. This paper asks whar accounrs for these dramatic shifts in the extent
ofcapital aovements across national borders, Three categories of
explanation are considered. The first emphasizes the policy regime
-
attributingthe unusual extent of capital flows prior ro 1914 to the
operation of the international gold standard, The second focuses on the
stages-of-indehtedness sometimes thought to characterize the process of
economic development. The third ascribes changes in the extent of capital
flows to the boom-and-bust cycles through which international capital markets
are thought to pass. Though each approach conrrihutes something to our
understanding of the phenomenon, none is totally satisfactory. I therefore
suggest an alternative explanation, which lays stress on the increase in the
magnitude of real interest rate and reel exchange race variability char has




Berkeley, CA 94720I. Introduction
Over the past century, the world economy has passed through a succession of phases
characterized by very different levels of international capital flows. This paper asks what
accounts for these dramatic shifts in the extent of capital movements across national borders.
The broad trends to be explained are as follows. Between 1880 and 1913, capital
movements among industrial and industrializing countries reached heights never scaled
subsequently. The absolute value of the current account of the balance of payments
averaged 2.9 per cent of CINP for a sample of 9 rapidly industrializing countries. Berween
1924 and 1936, current account balances were very considerably smaller; for the same
sample of countries they averaged 0.8 per cent of GNP. Between 1965 and 1986 they
recovered alightly, to an average of 1.3 per cent of ONPJJ
Thesebroad trends conceal other facts that require explanation. Each of the three
epochs, for example, contained a shorter period of 5 to 10 years marked by a dramatically
higher volume of international capital flows. Between 1902 and 1913, the absolute value of
the corrent account balance for our sample of 9 countries avenged 4.0 per cent of GNP.
Between 1925 and 1928, the comparable figure was 1.4 per cent;between 1973 and 1981. it
was 1.7 per cent. The 20th century has also been marked by repeated shifts in the
composition of foreign investment. Between WOO and 1913, U.S. direct foreign investment
(DFI) consistently exceeded foreign portfolio investment. Then from 1914 through 1928,
portfolio investment took the lead. For the next four decades, DPI was once more
consistently greater than portfolio investment abroad. After 1973. the relationship between
the two magnitudes reversed again.
The literature contains no wholly satisfactory explanation for these shifts in the extent of
capital flows, Three schools of thought may be distinguished. The first focuses on the
intemational financial and monetary regime. The exceptional volume of international capitalflows in the three decades prior to 1913isatuibuted to the operation of the international
gold standard (MclCinnon, 1989; Bayoomi, 1989). Exchange rare stability under the gold
standard minimized currency risks that otherwise discourage investment abroad. The
price-specie flow mechanism smoothly absorbed shifts in the volume of foreign lending
through accommodating changes in prices and/or spending and hence in the balance of ffadc.
Policymakers rook no steps to regulate foreign lending or to minimize current aciount
imbalances, so long as the current and private capital accounts were roughly offsetting and
central banks did not gain or lose significant reserves. Since the 1960s, in contrast,
exchange risk has discouraged investment abroat In this view, the surge of lending in the
1970a took place despite, not because of, the increased volatility of exchange rates,
The second school of thought focuses on the stages of indebtedaess through which
countries are thought to pass (de Vries, 1971; Siebert, 1989). Nations at the earliest stages
of development, according to this theory, lack the poiiticai and economic infrasmicturc
necessary to borrow abroad. As soon as those preconditions are put in place, borrowing
commences. The return on investment is high in the early stages of development, while
little saving is undertaken by households whose current income is less than their expected
future income. Hence there is considerable incentive to import financial capi;ai from sbrosd.
As development proceeds, incomes rise, as do savings. The stock of high-return investments
is depleted. Domestic saving comes to exceed domestic investment, and the infant capital
importer becomes a mature capital exporter. This model suggests that epochs of large-scale
foreign lending axe those characterized by pronounced divergences among countries in their
stages of development.
The third school focuses on the boom-and-buss cycles through which intemstional
capital markets ostensibly pass. Lending seems to be characterized by 20 year cycles
marked by, in succession, a surge of lending, a sudden halt, severe debt-servicing difficulties
2culminating in default ox rescheduling, and an extended period of inactivity (iCindleberger,
1986; Eichengreen and Lindert, 1989) Each cycle is inidated by financial innovation or a
disturbance to the pattern of international setdementa. The innovation or disturbance
provokes excessive enthusiasm which raises lending to unsustainable heights. Eventually, a
shock to financial or commodity markets curtails lending abruptly, revealing the difficulties
the borrowing counu-ies will face in servicing their debts. Reckless enthusiasm gives way to
extreme caution. International capital markets remain becalmed for a decade or more, until
another displacement reinitiases she process. Epochs of large-scale lending are those
characterized by long, heated booms and ahort, shallow busts.
The three main sections of this paper assess these three explanations fnr changes in the
volume of foreign lending. Though each approach has something to contribute to the
discussion, none of them is totally satisfactory. In the conclusion, I therefore suggest a new
direction in which research will have to proceed if it is to provide an adequate explanation
for the differences in the volume of international capital flows that have characterized the
last 100 years.
H.The Policy Regime
Astandard way of analyzing international capital movements, following Feldstein and
1-lorioka (1980), is through aaviogs-investment correlations. Recently, Bayoumi (1989) has
replicated Feldatein and Horioka's analysis of recent decades for the classical gold staodard
period. His finding of a lower correlation between domestic saving and investment before
1913 has been taken as evidence that the fixed exchange rates of gold standard encouraged
capital mobility and enhanced the efficiency with which resources were allocated
intemationally.2J In this section I reassess his findings and provide some additional results.
3As those whohave worked with Feldssein andHorioka's data know, measurement
problems arisewhenone attempts to compare savings and investment rates across countries.
Domesdcinvestmentis commonly taken asthe sumof fsxed and inventoryinvestment.
Differentdepreciation conveneonsprevail in different countries,creatingdifferent wedges
betweengrossandnetcapitalformation. Dataon inventoriesare gathered orimputedin
different ways For developing counnies, domestic saving is consmscsed typically as the
sum of domestic investment and the current account of the balance of payments. Not only
wsU errors in measuring investment therefore contaminate measures of saving, but the current
account is ttself measured with error. (Wimess the failure of global current account balances
to sum to zero.)
These problems are compounded when one attempts to utilize historical statistics. The
underlying data base is fngile. Historians who use it to retrospectively estimate national
income accounts are forced to adapt their accounting conventions to the imperatives of data
availability. Lack of information on stocks makes it all but impossible estimate inventory
investment for some cotsntries, for example.
Data problems pose special difficulties for comparisons over time. As the underlyiog
data base changes, so do the methods used to construct the national income accounts. I
attempt to minimize these problems by using, insofar as possible, components that are
constructed in similar ways and by combining the same components to construct aggregates.
Except where noted otherwise, I take investment as the sum of gross domestic fixed capital
formation (ODFCF) and net inventory investment, I take saving as the sum of investment
and the current account of the balance of payments, even for those portions of the 20th
century for which alternative savings measures exist3J
Bayoumi drew estimates of investment and the current account from Mitchell (1980) for
Denmark, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden and the U.K., and from Mitchell (1983) for
4Canada and Australia He averaged annual data, except for Canada prior to 1924, where for
investment and GNP it was necessary to interpolate between the estimates for the first year
of each decade.
A problem with these investment data is that inventories are not included for the U.K.,
Denmark, Sweden, Australia and Canada4j For the U.K., estimates of inventory invcstment
are in fact available in Feinstein (1972). Inventory investment is small relative to GDFCF
but highly variable. Between 1880 and 1914 its extreme values are on the order of -20 per
cent and ÷35 per cent of GDFCF. In what follows, I combine inventory investment with
GDFCF for the U.K.
In addition, subsequent work has improved earlier estimates nf capital formation. I have
subetituted recent figures from Feinstein (1988) for the U.K. and Urquhart (1986) for
Canada, and used some alternative estimates of U.S. savings constructed by Ransnm and
Sutch (1983)jJ I have extended these data using IMF (1988) for 1965-86.
Bsyoumi omits data for the U.S. on the grounds that American savings and investment
rates are higher and more correlated than those for other countries. The correlation
presumably reflects the fact that the U.S. current account was a smali and stable share of
UN? throughout the period. There are no obvious grounds for challenging either of these
properties of the series. It is not clear why U.S. investment rates should be more suspect
than analogous figures for other countries, since they are constructed using similar methods.
I have therefore included the U.S. throughout, although I utilize in addition to the standard
series an alternative measure of U.S. savings rates constructed by Ransom and Sutch (1983).
Table I reports regressions of investment on savings (expressed as shares of GDP) for
vanous subperiods. The slope coefficient of 0.63 in the basic regression for 1880-1913 is
nearly twice as large as Bayoumi's and, in contrast with his results, significantly different
from zero at the 90 per cent confidence level. The next three lines show that essentially the
5Table I
Cross-Section Regressions for Nine Countries
(Dependent Variable is Investment/National Income)
Period Data Constant Savings/National IncomeP2
1880-1913 0.06 0.63 36
(1.44) (2.00)
1880-1890 0.06 0.59 .35
(1.65) (1.94)
1891-1901 0.04 0.71 .58
(1.58) (3.10)
1902-1913 0.05 0.72 .21
(0.65) (1.38)
1880-1913 PS 0.07 0.50 .39
(2.24) (2.13)
1924-1936 -0.01 1.06 .90
(0.22) (7.83)
1925-1930 -0.02 1.22 .85
(0.90) (6.32)
1924-1936 PS 0.05 0.57 .39
(1.36) (2.14)
1925-1930 RS 0.06 0.58 .31
(1.15) (1.78)
1965-1986 0.01 1.04 .87
(0.02) (6.93)
1973-1981 . -0.05 1.29 .89
(1.23) (7.51)
Notes:t-statistics in parentheses. The countries are Britain, Germany, Italy, Sweden,
Norway, Denmark, Australia, Canada and the Unhed States. Unless otherwise
noted, equations are estimated by ordinary least squares and savings is
measured as the sum or investment and the current account. PS denotes that
Ransom and Sutch savings figures have been substituted for the U.S.same result holds for the individualdecadesthat comprise the period.The
savings-investmentcorrelation is highest before 1900; only for the final decade preceding
World War I is it impossible to reject the null of a zero coefficient at standard confidence
levels.
While these results weaken Bayoumi's conclusion of no savings-investment correlation
for the gold standard period, the contrast with recent decades remains, For the period
1965-86. using data for ten industrial countries, Bayoumi estimated a slope coefficient of
0.97 with a standard error of 0.11. My estimate of 1.04 with a standard error of (US for
the same 9 counties considered for the gold standard period is consistent with Bayoumi's
and Feldstein-Horioka's results. Although domesdc savings appears to have mattered for
invesmient in both periods, international capital movements did mure to weaken the
savings-invesssnenc correlation in the earlier era.
An objection to these inferences is that savings is an endogenous variable. A rise in
invesussenc will plausibly raise income and observed savings. When both savings and
investtoent are expressed as shares of GNP, however, the extent and perhaps even the
direction of the bias is unclear. Frankel (1989) finds that correcting Feldstein and Horiuka's
regressions for simultaneity has little impact on the coefficients. The same result obtains
here4/
Bus is the contrast between 1880-1914 and 1965-86 properly attributable to the policy
regime? Table 1 also provides results for the interwar gold standard period (1925-31). The
savinga-inveaunent correlation is considerably stronger than prior so 1913. Thus, it does not
appear that institution of the gold standard is sufficient to reduce the savings-investment
correlation to 1880-1913 levels,
One could argue in rebuttal that the interwas- regime was not a true gold standard. I am
not sure what such an objection would mean. Certainly the interwar system was universal in
6scope; at its height in 1931, 47 countriesparticipated. Itcombined the three distinguishing
featuresof a goldstandard: fixed prices of gold, freedom tn import and export gold, and
rules linking central bank liabilities to their gold reserves. True, a numher of countrieshad
to intervene to defend convertibility early in the period, and the system collapsed starring in
1931. Butsimilarproblems characterized the prewar gold standard. Latin American
countrieswererepeatedly forced offthe gold standardinthe finaldecades of the 19th
century.In 1895 the U.S. caine close to suspending convertibility, events of which investors
were fully aware (GarberandGrilli, 1986). The interwargoldstandard reduced the
exchange risk premiumtolow levels, the effect ostensibly so conducive to international
capital rnobiliry.Z'
What then accounts for the smallervolumeof capital flows under the inrerwar gold
standard compared tothegold standardofprewaryears?A plausible explanation lies inthe
measurestakenbygovemments todiscourage lendingandborrowing afterWorld WarI.
TheBritish government discouraged long-term overseas lending, especially outside the
Commonwealth, when Britain'sbalance-of-payments positionwas weak. The German
governmentdiscouragedlong-termforeign borrowingatartingin 1927. Overseas borrowing
bytheAustralianCommonwealthandStates was strictly controlledbya centralized Loan
Council starring in 1928. The U.S. State Departmentscreened foreignloanspriorto theft
issue and nceasionsllyraised objections,although these were not always effectivelyenforced.
Thus, a likely explanation forthe declinein overseas lending andborrowingafter World
War I is capital-marker interventionbygovernments.
Such interference in the operation of the market wasnotunknown prior to 1913. Then
too theBank ofEnglandhaddiscouragedlendingwhencapitaloutflows threatened to
exacerbate a balance-of-payments crisis, as in 1906-01. The French and German
7governments consistently regulated the direction and level of foreign lending (Fishlow,
19S5). Still, intervention was less prevalent before World War I than it became thereafter.
The observation that official management of overseas lending was more prevalent in the
1920s than before 1913 only pushes the question back a step further. Why did governments
find it necessary to defend convertibility by regulating international lending in the 1920s but
not before 1913? This raises the complicated issue of why the interwar gold standard
seemed to operate less smoothly than its prewar predecessor. The popular hypotheais that
the ratio of international reserves to monetary liabilities was lower after World War I,
making disturbances more difficult to abosorb, does not withstand scrurioy.PJ More
important was the international distribution of reserves: the U.S. and France were in strong
surplus throughout the period, draining gold reserves from other central banks and
intensifying the balance-of-payments pressure on countries like the U.K. The intemadonal
monetary policies of the U.& and France placed balance-of-payments pressure on other
nations, to which their governments responded by curtailing capital flows. Insofar as the
scale of lending prior to 1913 was possible only given a smoothly-operating international
monetary system, the explanation lies in the absence of significant ssymmetries between
surplus and deficit countriea and specifically in the willingness of surplus countries to
adjust9i
Three additional explanations for the contrast between the prewar and interwar gold
standards warrant mention. First, it is argued that foreign lending was encouraged before
1913 by linkages between capital and commodity markets, Countries that borrowed from
Britain imported capital goods from British suppliers. Hence a debit to the British
balance-of-payments due to a capital outflow was quickly offset by a credit due to increased
merchandise exports. Though these linkages operated, the induced increase in merchandise
exports was smalI.j/ Foreign lending typically financed population-sensitive investnsents in
8infrasnuesure, notably housing, which did not generate a significant demand for British
capital goods. Insofar as a county like Canada used foreign finance to import capital goods,
it purchased them from the United States. There is little evidence that the U.S. used its
revenues from merchandiae exporta to Canada to purchase commodity imports from the U.K.
There is even less evidence of the operation of these linkages in the case of the other
creditors. French lending to Russia generated little demand for French commodity exports.
for example (White, 1936).
Second, a less turbulent political environment may have encouraged lending prior to
1913. Default on sovereign debt typically was associated with political revolution, after
which a new government repudiated or renegotiated the debta incurred by its predecessor.
British lending to Canada, Aoatalia, New Zealand and the United States was lending to
regions of exceptional political stability. Aside from the U.S. Civil War, which came toward
the end of the period of large-scale US. foreign borrowing, there were few notable instances
of political instability in the regiona so which Britain lens. Local adminiauations were ron
by British emigres. Members of the British Commonwealth of Nations retained formal
political tiea so the mother county which aurely reduced the likelihood of sovereign default.
This argument does not carry over, however, to counties like Argentina and Brazil, to which
Britain alao lent heavily. Nor does it apply to the loans so Russia, Turkey and Latin
America undertaken by France and Germany.
A third possibility is that overseas lending was encouraged in the final decades of she
19th century by exceptional rate of return differentials between domestic and foreign
investment. This is the hyposheaia suggested by she stages of indebtedness approach, to
which I now turn.
9Ill. Stages of Indebtedness
The simplest way of exposingthelogic of the stages of indebtedness approach is with
the model of Blanchard (1983). Assume no gowth of populadon L, no depreciation of the
capital stock K, no repudiation of foreign debt B, and no technical change. Assume
further that the subjective discount rate is equal to the world interest rate 0.
A social planner maximizes welfare:
¶5t Jeau(CJdt (1)
subject to:
B1 = C + I [1 + V('t)] + GB1 - FTK1, C).
it = k, (2)
K01B1, given; >0,Fjc>0,Fjcc0.
where C is consumption and the capital stock can be adjusted through investment I subject
to convex costs of adjustment w- To prevent the country from accumulating debt
indefinitely, the rransversality condition:
tim cOt B1 = 0. (3) t—
is assumed to hold. First order conditions are:
101 ÷ vO) ÷ KuIf(1Q) =q,




B1 =8B1+C1÷ K1[1 +W(K1)l - F(K1,L).
The solution takes a simple form. in each period, the country invests to the point where the
marginal product nf capital, net of adjustment cnsts, equals the world interest rate. This
determines the capital stock, which determines output From the sssnmptinn that the
discount rate equals the interest rate, consumption is constant over time.
Starting from a position where its marginal efficiency of capital is high relative to thc
world interest rate, a country horrows abroad to finance a high level of current investment in
addition to its constant level of consumption. When the backlog of unusually pmfitable
investment opportunities is exhausted, foreign borrowing stops. From this point domestic
output must exceed domestic consumption to service deht to foreigners.
Note that this gets us only part way to the debt cycle resolt. Althoogh the current
account of the balance of payments swings from deficit to surplus, debt is not repaid. It is
simply serviced for the rest of time (Siebert, 1989). Were we to make the subjective rate of
discount a declining function of contemporaneous utility, however, the shadow price of
consumption would fall over time and debt would be repaid. (Note that this assumption is
the opposite of the Uzawa (1968) formulation.) If this effect is sufficiently strong, the infant
debtor will become a mature creditor.
11The model suggests that one should observe large capital flows across borders when the
marginal efficiency of investment and the propensity to save are very different across
countries. The marginal efficiency of investment will differ moss markedly across countries
that are at very different stages of development. The incentive for international capital flows
therefore increases with the gap between income and productivity in the leading enuntry --
Britainprior to 1913, the U.S in the l970s --andthe rest of the world.
Table 2 shows Kravis er al's estimates of incomes per capita in 1970 U.S. dollars for a
selection of countries, along with Crafts' (1983) estimates for 1870 constructed using similar
procedures. Russia, Italy and (for the beginning of she period) the United States
are the main 19th century capital importers included in the sable, Russia and Italy's incomes
per capita are estimated so have been 30 and 50 per cent, respectively, of Britain's in 1870.
Per capita incomes in the U.S. were 80 per cent of those in Britain by these calcuiations.UI
Per capita incomes in Canada were probably slightly lower than this, while those for
Australia were quite close to those of the United StasesjZ/
In 1970 the gap between bon-owers and lenders was considerably larger. According to
Kravis es al., Colombian CINP per capita was 18 per cens of that in she United Stases. Other
estimates include 23 per cent for Bran, 28 per cent for Mexico and 30 per cent for Chile.
Of the major Latin American borrowers, only Argentina and Venezuela, with 39 and 41 per
cent of U.S. per capita incomes respeesively, overlap with the range occupied by the leading
19th cenmry borrowersjj/ This implies that the incentive so reallocate capital
internationally was greater in the l970a than a century before. Of course, only under
restrictive assumptions is output per capita an appropriate proxy for she marginal efficiency
of snvessmens. Still, the available statistics do not readily support a stages-of-indebtedness
explanation for the extent of capital flows.14/
12Table 2
PurchasingPower-Parity-Based Incomes Per Capita
(in 1970 U.S. dollars)
1870 1970
Britain100 United States = 100
Great Britain 1000 63.5
















Note: ne signities not available.
Source: Crafts (1983), Table 1; U.S. Department ot Conmerce (1976), p. 224; Kravis
et al, (1978), Table 4, ccl. 2.This discussion has focused on investment. The magnitude of international capital flows
depends on international divergences in savings rates as well. It may be that capital
movements were encouraged prior to 1913 by an unusually low level of savings in the
regions of recent settlement. Figures 1-4 provide some support for this hypothesis. Figure 1
shows that the savings rate in Ausowlia rose steadily from less than 5 per cent in the second
half of the l860s to roughly 13 per cent by the end of the l870sJ5/ Capital inflows
financed approximately a third of domestic investment in this period but considerably less
after 1895. Other movements io savings rates, notably the 1895-1900 decline, are less easily
reconciled with the model. Savings and investment rates fluctuated sympsthedcally over the
period, as if the former remained an important determinant of the latter. (The correladon
coefficient between the two series plotted in the figure is 0.33.)
Figure 2 shows the same series for Great Britain. There was no comparable rise in the
savings rate over the half century prior to 1913. The figure's most notable feature is the
Kuznets-cycle.-like fluctuation of domestic investment, a phenomenon familiar to economic
historians.
Canada experienced a dramatic rise in savings around the tam of the centiuy, as ahown
in Figure 3. The rise in the rate from roughly 10 per cent of GNP to nearly 20 per cent is
consistent with the stages model. As in Auswalia, however, there are periods early in the
development process, such as the late 1880s, when the savings ratio declines As in
Auswalia, savings and investment ratea axe positively correlaxed. The period of largest
capital inflows (1905-13) was also the period when domestic saving was highest
Figure 4 shows the behavior of these series for the United StatesJ/ Annual estimates
have not been published for the antebellum period, when the U.S. was most plausibly in she
low-savings stage of developmentj.2J Nonetheless, the data for the 1870s tue revealing,
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—INVIGNP SAV1NG/GNPSource: Feinsteiø (1972, 1979)capital.Suggestively, savings rates were unusually low. An unusually large share of
domestic i.nvesunent was financed by foreign borrowing. The U.S. savings rate then rose in
steps to a peak around the turn of the century. U.S. net foreign borrowing came to an end,
setting the stage for America'a shift from net foreign debtor to net foreign creditor during
World War I. As lii Canada and Australia, however, other fluctuations in the savings ratc
are not easily reconciled with the model. Notable among these are declines in the ratio
during the 1880s and in the fsrat decade of the 20th century.
This evidence suggests that savings rates, and by implication international capital
movements which are a function of savings among other variables, have significant
determinants other than the relationship of current to permanent income emphasized in the
stages model. The determinant of savings highlighted in much of the literature (e.g.
Edelstein, 1982) is popolatioo structure. When there is a high propostnn of dependent
children and young workers in the population, savings rates will he low. Conversely, when
there is a high proportion of persons in their prime savings years (ages 40-49), savings rates
will be high. By this interpretation, savings rates were low in early 19th America and late
19th century Canada and Australia not simply because these countries were in the early
stages of economic development, but because they were regions of recent settlement
populated by immigrants who had not yet reached their prime savings years. Evidence in
Table S on population structure is consistent with these tends. There is a more pronounced
downward tend in the share of population under the age of 15 in the U.S., Canada and
Australia than in Great Britain, conaistent with the hypnthesis that there should have been a
more drasnatie rise in savings rates.
These same demographic factors go some way toward explaining cyclical fluctuations.
In Australia, population composition was driven by the arrival of immigrants in their 20's in
eesponse to the gold rush of the 1850s. As these immigrants aged, the share of the
15
14Table 3
Share of the Population Under Age 15 and Over Age 60
and in the Prime Saving Years 40 to 49
A: Fercant of Poulation less than 15 or over 60
B: Percent of population aged 40 to 49
UnitedStates Australia Canada Britain
A B A 8 A B A B
1851 45.6 1.9 49,1 7.5 42.7 9.9
1861 44.8 8.3 29.5 7.5 47.3 7.6 43.110.3
1871 44.2 9.1 36.3 8.4 47.2 8.1 43.610.1
1881 43.7 9.1 35.1 8.4 45.1 8.4 43.8 9.8
1891 41.7 9.4 42.0 8.3 43.5 8.9 42.5 9.9
190i 40.810.1 41.310.0 42.010.0 39.210.5
1911 38.810.6 38.211.5 41.010.1 38.711,5
Notes:Figures br the U.S. are for 1850, 1860, 1870, 1880, 1890, 1900, and 1900.
Figures for Britain are for England and Wales only.
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Source: I(uznets(ni.) and U.S. —INU/GHP SAUIHG/GNP Dept. of CoNwerse (1976)Australian population aged 40 to 49 peaked in the late 1870s and early 1880s, Kelly (1968)
notes that the subsequent decline in Australian saving waa associated with a rise in the
dependency ratio and a fall in the share of the population aged 40 to 49. As these ratios
reversed themselves in the 1890a, the savings rate recovered. Similar fluctuations are
evident in Canada and the Uoitcd States, The rise in Canadian savings rates arostud the turn
of the century, for example, was associated with a decline in the share of population under
15 and, more importantly, in the share over 65. The share in the prime earning years of
40-49 peaked between 1901 and 1913, coincident with the peak in savings rates.
Still, Canadian population structure does not seem to fluctuate enough to produce so
dramatic a rise in savings behavior as occurred after the turn of the century. Nor is there an
obvious demographic explanation for the fluctuation of U.S. savings rates. This serves tu
remind that other factors contributed to tends and fluctuations in savinga. The development
of financial intermediaries which rewarded savers for thrift and reduced the nattiness of
financial assets, a factor emphasized by Davis and Gallman (1973) for the United States,
surely operated in the other countries as well. Table 4 suggests that its influence was likely
to be felt in Britain up through 1880 and in Canada as late as 19l3J5/ Shifts in the
distribution of income between industry and agriculture and in its concentration within the
population may have also played a role.
Perhaps most importantly, changes in the profitability of investment and hence in the
rate of return may have stimulated savings. Only this can explain why foreign borrowing
and domestic saving covsried positively in the regions of recent settlement. Domestic
savings would have crowded out capital inflows and vice versa, producing a negative
correlation, unless both were driven by fluctuations in domestic retums. The literatures on
the opening of the frontier, the westward expansion of the railways, and induced technical






Notes;na signifies not available,
Source: Goldsmith (1969), p. 209.
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96fluctuations in the rate of return that were autonomous from the point of view of saving and
investment.
Yet the extent of the correlation --inother words, the responsiveness of capital inflows
to the same factors that heightened the incentive for domestic saving sod investment --
seemsto have varied over time. This brings us to the third school of thought which
emphasizes hoont-and-bost cycles in intemational capital markets.
IV. Boom-and-Bust Cycles
The boom-and-bust approach extends to the international setting Minsky a (1972) model
of financial instability. incomplete information combines with departures from rationality to
produce excess volatility in financial marketsj9f The result is decades of large-scale foreign
lending altemating with periods during which little if any lending takes place.
The process is set off by a disturbance to the markets which focuses investors' attention
on foreign opporsunidea. A decline in the case of retom ott domestic investments or a rise in
returns abroad causes them to redirect their attention to opportunities overseas. A financial
innovation, such as the rise of securities affiliates of commercial banks in the 1920s or the
growth of international loans by banks themselves in the 1970s, may stimulate the supply of
foreign loans. Alternatively, a disturbance to the pattem of balance-of-payments settiements,
such as war debts and reparations in the 1920s or the oil shock in the 1970s, may stimulate
the demand.
Whatever the displacement, lending, once underway, quickly reaches unsustainable
heights. During the period of excessive enthusiasm, virtually any overseas issue is
enthusiastically subscribed. So long as lending continues, the situation is sustained.
Borrowers obtain new loans to service existing obligations. Problems arise when sonic event
intervenes to stem the free flow of capital. That event might be a political upheaval in a
16borrowing county, as iii 1890, o the increased attractiveness of domestic invesenents, as in
1928.2P1 Once lending is curtailed, the debt-servicing difficulties of the borrowers are
revealed. Interest payments see interrupted. Default and extended negotiations over a new
repayment schedule then follow. Excessive enthusiasm in the intemational financial centers
gives way to extreme pessimism. Debtors are unable to secure long-term exsemal finance at
any price. Creditors search out alternative inveatnent vehicles that are less risky than
foreign loans. Little international lending takes place for a decade or more, until the crisis is
forgotten and another displacement sets off the process anew.
The first modem debt cycle is usually placed at the beginning of rhe 19th century. U.S.
states and Latin American republics borrowed heavily in the 1 820s. Latin American
independence set off a speculative mania in London, as scores of companies were formed to
exploit the natural resources of what had previously been a Spanish domain. When the
prices of raw materials slumped in 1825 and banks with links to commodity markett
experienced distress, lending ground to a halt. All but one of the newly-independent Latin
American states quickly defaulted on their debts, followed by many U.S. states in the 1830s.
Renegotiation of these obligations took 20 years or more. In the meantime, potential
borrowers found themselves bereft of external finance.
With the passage of a quarter century, the problems of this earlier era were forgotten:
By the late 1860s, large-scale lending to Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Chile and she United States
had resumed. Financial crises its Vienna, Berlin and New York in 1873 then brought this
second cycle to a halt. Another wave of Latin American defaults ensued. Turkey and
Egypt suspended debt service. The collapse of the bond marker reinforced the financial and
commercial crisis of the European financial centers. Once more the intemational capital
market lapsed intn inactivity.
17This dma, however, Britain had new institutions in place. The Council of Foreign
Bondholders. linked to the London Stock Exchange, threatened to impose sanctions on
recalcitrant debtors and negotiated effectively on behalf of the creditors. Defaults were
resolved more rapidly, arid by the 1880s a new lending wave was underway. This time a
large volume of direct investments accompanied portfolio capital inflows to Latin America.
Argentina. Mexico and Brazil were favored by direct investors, Argentina and Uruguay by
bondholders. The United States and Canada also enjoyed a large volume of capital inflows.
In 1890 this third lending boom was brought to a halt by the Baring Crisis. Leading
recovered after the turn of the century. This time, however, the creditors favored counnies
where for political reasons default was unlikely: Canada and South Africa before 1905,
Canada and India thereafter.
The two great lending booms of the 20th century can be characterized in similar terms.
The need for external funds to finance European reconstruction after World War I combined
with the rise of securities affiliates and international branching by New York banks to
encourage Americsn lending to Central Europe and Latin America between 1925 and 1928.
The leading New York baoks had scores of representatives in the field, competing for the
business of sometimes reluctant foreign bonowers. The banks opened storefronts to market
foreign bonds to American investors previously unacquainted with their merits. By the
late-1920s government officials and other observers were already warning of the market's
excesses. Even before the Great Depression struck, the Wall Street boom siphoned off the
available liquidity, bringing lending to an end. Any tendency for foreign investment to
rebound following the Wall Street crash and the decline in U.S. interest rates was dashed by
default in Latin America in 1931, in Eastern Europe in 1932, and by Germany in 1933.
The market's recovery was difficult and delayed. Many defaulted loans were not
successfully renegotiated until the l940s and, in some instances, until the middle of the
181950s. This residue of nonperforming loans discouraged portfolio investment abroad. Fmm
the mid-forties through the mid-'sixties, US. capital exports took the form mainly of direcs
foreign investment (Pigure 5).Onlyin the early 1970s, when memory of these defaults had
dimmed, did money center banks awash in liquidity hazard another round of portfolio
investment abroad,
This passage paints the history of international lending with a broad brush, in tones
intended to suggest consonance with the boon-and-bust model. The picture has obvious
appeal Not only does it provide a rationale for the episodes of large-scale lending that
seem to alternate with periods of inactivity in international capital markets, but it goes some
way toward explaining shifts between direct and postfolio investment. The importance of
DR in the 1ES[}s and after World War Il can be seen as a reaction against the risks of
portfolio lending. The experience of the 1930s, in particular, is seen as having driven home
the dangers of government loans. Direct investment, notwithstanding the possibility of
nationalization, was perceived as a less risky enterprise. There are other, complementary
explanations for the rise of DR after World War II. New technologies may have offered
economies of scale and scope that cried our for internstional application. The growth of
Fuin-specific knowledge that its owners did not wish to licence or sell may have led them to
exploit it by establishing branches abroad, Still, none of these complementary explanations
is inconsistent with the notion that lingering memory of the defaulted bonds of the l930a
contributed to the rise of direct investment.fl/
The assumption that investors do not leans from experience and are doomed to repeas
she same mistakes every 30 years is troubling, to say the least. This assumption is
rationalized in various ways. The bankers who extended sovereign loans in the l97lls werc
a different generation from those responsible for the bond flotations of the 1920s. It is hard









US.DIRECT AND PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT ABROAD AS SHARES OF CHP
Souroe Stallfnqs (198?) Note: live sear NOvin5 averagesyouth of the typical bank loan officer. Even bankers whostudied thepastwould not have
concluded that sovereign lending did not pay. Even when defaults intervened, creditors
typically recovered their principal and enjoyed a return comparable to that on low-risk assets
(Eichengreen, 1989c; Linden, 1989). In other words, interest-rate premia adequately
compensated investors for the special risks of foreign lending. if the borrowing countries
were the same, the govemments were of a totally different complexion from those that had
defaulted on their obligations 40 years before. Changes in political and economic regime
gave little cause for concern that previous experience, however ditatu'ous, would be
repeated.
Ultimately, however, the model does not provide a satisfying explanation for variations
in the volume of lending across historical epochs. It implies that the volume of lending was
large in the half century prior to 1914 because the period contained three boom phases (the
early 1870s, the late i8BOs, and the first decade of the 20th century). In contwst. the
lending boom of the 1920s lasted only four years and that of the 1970s only a few years
more, while the two 20th century lending booms were separated by a 40 year interval in
which little foreign portfolio investment took place. Yet the institutional changes highlighted
by the model (development of bondholders' committees, the Paris Club and the International
Monetary Fund, all of which presumably reduced the costs of rescheduling) suggest that the
lulls between booms should have grown shorter, not longer. They provide no obvious
explanation for variations in the magnitude of lending during the boom periods themselves.
Thus, while this approach captures the cyclical character of the lending process, it does not
adequately explain the contrasts between epochs.
20Figure 6
JHDJCESOF RELATIVE PRICES OF PRIMARY COMHODITIES
S4
25 IIII
19919889 19 29 U 49 58 68 18881986
Source: Lewis (1979), Grilli and Yang (1988).Figure 7
COEFFIC1EHTOF UAA1T1OH OF RELATIUE PRICE OF PRIKAJWCONNODITIES
HDte oefticientoF va'iaion beseil on oLervationto t—4.
198V. Conclusions and Speculations
Noneof the standard explanationsforshifts over time in the volume of foreign lending
accounts adequately for the phases through which international capital markets have passed
over the last 100 years Minsky's model of financial instability captures the boom andbuss
character of lending hut does oot explain why the booms are sometimes more pronouocad.
more extended and more frequent. The stages-of-lodebtedness model, by focusing oo
domestic savings sod investment, speaks more directly to the question of why the volume of
lending has changed ao markedly ever time. Em its prediction, that the volume of lending
should be greatest when international divergences in the stage of development and hence is
incentives for savings and investment are greatest, is not clearly supported by the data.
Factors other than the incentives for savings and investment associated with counties' stages
of development teem to play a dominant role in determining the volume of foreign lending.
Analyses that focus on the policy regime come closest to providing a satisfactory answer
to the qoestion. Sot the contrast between the classical and ioterwar gold standards suggests
that it was not exchange-rate stability per se that promoted international lending prior to
1913, but minimal current-account targeting by the authorities. As noted above, this Ending
only transforms the question into another: why did governments find it unnecessary to
defend exchange rste stability by regulating international lending prior to 1913, whereas they
found such intervendon essential thereafter?
Perhaps these explanations are incomplete because each one neglects another critical
determinant of the volume of foreign lending, Lending proceeds for extended periods and
reaches high levels when it is not interrupted by crisis. One deterrrunant of the frequency
and severity of debt crises, emphasized by authors such as Marichal (1989), is the instability
of commodity prices and interest rates. Interest-rate shocks and cyclical instability in the
developed world disrupt the free flow of capital to borrowing regions. When disruptiont to
21Figure
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Municipal —)&railway6) bone iinus annual wholesale price inflationthe supply of external finance coincide with a slump in the prices of developing-country
exports.. dcfault ensues, leading to a sustained collapse of long-term lending. Insofar as
these shocks impact snevenly on the creditor countriet, those suffering balance-of-payments
deterioration intervene to discourage foreign lending.
Hence the greater volume of lending prior to 1913 may reflect a lower incidence of
interest-rate and cnmmodity-price shocks that disrupt thc lending process. Figures 6-8 are
consonant with this hypothesis. Figures 6 and 7 display the level and variability of the
Lewis (1978) and Grilli-Ysng (1988) indices of the relative price of exports of nonfuel
primary commodities and exports of manufactures. It is clear that this relative price wae
more stable prior to 1913 than it became subsequently, Figure 8 shows two measures of thc
real interest rate. Again, it appears that this series was more stable prior to 1913 than
subsequendy./
At a minimum, these series are nor inconsistent with the notion that the inereaseri
prevslence of interest-rate and commodity-price shocks has conthbuted to the relative decline
of intemational lending in the 20th century. Understanding the exceptional volume of
foreign lending in periods like 1880-1913 therefore requires an explanation for the
exceptional stability of commodity prices and interest rates. Perhaps this brings ss back to
the operation of the inremational monetary and fmsncial system, although it is now more
than the singular stability of exchange rates under the gold standard that is at stake.FOOTNOTES
1. The counties are Australia, Canada, Denmark, Cierrnany, Italy, Norway, Sweden, the
IlK. and the U.S. The figures in the text are unweighted averages of county statistics.
The underlying data are described in Section ft The rationale for focusing on these
countrieswillbecome clear below.Notethat this introduction refers to the extent of
capital flows rather than to 'the degree of capital mobility." The volume of capital flows
across borders depends both on the costs of capital movements (transactions costs and border
taxes, factors commonly thought to determine "the degree of capital mobility) and the
benefits thereof (rate of return differentials and other factors that provide capital an incentive
to move). In other words, capital may be highly mobile but may not move if it has no
incentive to do so.
2. Bayoumi (1989) is appropriately cautious in interpreting his results. Others (viz
Economist Magazine, 1989) have, however, attributed his findings to the operation of the
gold standard, and specifically to its reduction of exchange risk. "So todays global capital
market might be divided after all —notby factors such as sovereign credit risk, legal
differences and what have you, but by sheer uncertainty over currencies. Govemments have
boldly dismantled their capital controls, but in tolerating exchange-rate volatility they may
have left an equally effective --andequally harmful --barrierin place. See also Bayoumi
(1990) for another description of his results which attaches more weight to the exchange-risk
view.
3. Exceptions to these rules and the rationale for each are detailed below,
4. Analogous problems arise when attempting to measure national savings in developing
counties today. See Aghevli et al. (1990). p. 57. An additional problem is that for
Germany the data measure net investment and net national product rather than figures gross
of depreciation. The fact that depreciation is netted out of both the numerator and
denominator of the ratio minimizes the bias.
5:ForCanada, Urquhart's new annual estimates of capital formation remove the need to
interpolate between figures for the beginning of each decade,
6. Instruments included letters posted, working age population, total population, coal
consumed, and the infant mortality rate. The use of instruments tended to alter the standard
errors but to have little impact on the point estimates.
7. In Eichengreen (1989) I estimated the risk premium using monthly data for seven
currencies against sterling. It was on avenge only 20 per cent as large during the gold
standard period as during the period of managed floating in the 1930s and only 17 per cent
as large as during the free float of 1922- 26.
8. The evidence is discussed in Eichengreen (1989a),
9. This is not to argue that the system was symmetrical, only that the entire burden of
adjustment was not placed on the deficit counties. Evidence on this question is discussed
further in Eichengreen (1987). New developments in the 1920s which reduced the
willingness and ability of the surplus counties to adjust are discussed in Eiehengreen
(1989a).
2310. There is some evidence that foreign lending stimulated merchandise exports and at
improvement in the trade balance in the case of Britain, as shown in Eichengreen (1989b).
Theincrement to merchandise exports and the improvement in the trade balance were small,
however, compared to the capital outflow.
11. Comparing the U.S. Department of Commerce (1976, p.224) estimate of per capita U.S.
income in 1869-78, converted to 1970 dollars, with Crafts' figures for Britain for 1870 and
1880 yields 79 per rent.
12. Urquhart (1986) provides new per capita income figures for Canada, although the lack
of purchasing power parity conversions renders direct comparitons difficult. Similarly, while
it is often argued that Australian incomes per capita in the late 19th century were higher
than those for the U.S. (or even for Britain), it is likely that the available figures are inflated
by inadequate price indices that fail to capture the high enst of Australian nontraded goods.
13. Figures quoted in this paragraph are drawn from Kravis et al. (1978), Table 4, cul. 2.
14. Assume for example, following Lucas (1990), that production in all counties obeys the
same Cobb Douglas production function y =Ax5,where y is output per capita, x is the
capital/labor ratio, and A is the common intercept If 3 =0.4.then the marginal product
of capital is approximately (3* as large in a country where y y as in another cnontry
where y3y0.
15. The five year moving averagea are for years t-4 through t. The figure for 1875 is a
five year average of the data for 1871-75, for example.
16. The annual estimates of gross domestic fixed capital fnrmadon and (SN? are from
Kuznets (n.d.), variant 1. Data on she current account are from U.S. Department of
Commerce (1976). There is a break in the current account series in 1900, I have averaged
the two figures for that year designed to be consistent with the pre-1900 and post-1900
series 1 use the Kurnets (IMP series because it was constructed in a manner consistent with
the capital formation series. Recent work hat questioned the cyclical properties of the
Kuanets series but not their level. Taking five-year moving averages filters nut cyclical
movements nf less than this perindicity, which should dir nate moat of the bias.
17. Robert Gailman has constructed estimates of capital formation by decade, however.
These can be combined with independent estimates of the current account to gauge broad
trends in U.S. savings. Edelstein (1982, p.234) calculates that they imply a rise in the U.S.
savings rate from 9.1 per cent in 1834-43 to 10.9 per cent in 1839-48, 12.5 per cent in
1944-53, and 14.4 per cent in 1849-58.
18. One worries, of coume, that the podtive association between the savings rate and the
financial asset/inenme ratio reflects the impact of savings on financial deeping as well as the
Converse,
19.The version of the model described in the text is estentially that of Kindleberger
(1986). An application to sovereign lending in the 1970s is Ounentag and Herring (1985).
2420. In both instances it can be argued that declining primary commodity prices undermined
the debt-servicing capacity of the borrowing regions and contribuced to the slump in lending.
Sec Eichengreen (1990).
21. One can argue that borrower country preferences also mattered for the composition of
lending. In the 1970a, for example, bank finance was viewed as more permissive and less
politically onerous than JET. One can argue similarly that this preference was reversed in
the 1980g.
22. Though the 1950s and 1960a are an exception to this rule, the 1970s and 1980s again
fit the pattern. The cx post real interest rete is shown in Figure 8. The two interest rates
and the wholesale price indec underlying this figure are from U.S. Department of Commerce
(1976). MeKissnon and Robinson (1990) analyze nominal interest rates (in contsdistinctinn
to the real rates analyzed here) and argue similarly that (1) rates were less volatile under the
gold standard, and (ii) foreign investment was promoted by this stability of interest rates.
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